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Abstract 
This article explores metaphorical language in the strand of contemporary fiction that Trexler (2015) 
discusses under the heading of ‘Anthropocene fiction’—namely, novels that probe the convergence 
of human experience and geological or climatological processes in times of climate change. Why 
focus on metaphor? Because, as cognitive linguists working in the wake of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
have shown, metaphor plays a key role in closing the gap between everyday, embodied experience 
and more intangible or abstract realities—including, we suggest, the more-than-human temporal 
and spatial scales that come to the fore with the Anthropocene.  
In literary narrative, metaphorical language is typically organized in coherent clusters that amplify 
the effects of individual metaphors. Based on this assumption, we discuss the results of a systematic 
coding of metaphorical language in three Anthropocene novels by Margaret Atwood, Jeanette 
Winterson, and Ian McEwan. We show that the emergent metaphorical patterns enrich and 
complicate the novels’ staging of the Anthropocene, and that they can destabilize the strict 
separation between human experience and nonhuman realities. 
Introduction 
In a World Wildlife Fund campaign for climate change created by Belgian design studio BBDO, we 
see the familiar image of a wafer cone topped with melting ice cream. However, the scoop of ice 
cream was digitally modified to look like the Earth, with clouds and a large swathe of the Asian 
continent clearly visible.2 This is a striking visual metaphor for anthropogenic climate change: the 
melting ice cream stands for the Earth’s diminishing polar caps. In the visual as well as in the 
linguistic domain, the use of metaphorical language in climate change discourse is not surprising. In 
philosopher Dale Jamieson’s words, ‘[climate] change poses threats that are probabilistic, multiple, 
indirect, often invisible, and unbounded in space and time. Fully grasping these threats requires 
scientific understanding and technical skills that are often in short supply’ (2014: 67). The 
intangibility of climate change calls for metaphorical language that is able to translate scientific 
models into concrete, affect-laden imagery. The vast majority of humans will never experience the 
melting of polar ice directly—although they may experience its devastating effects. BBDO’s visual 
metaphor offers a human-scale equivalent for the abstract causality involved in rising sea levels. The 
image takes on a sense of urgency as it evokes childhood memories of melting ice cream; it implies 
that humanity is rapidly—and childishly—consuming the limited resources of the planet. 
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So-called ‘conceptual metaphor theory’ in the wake of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) work is 
particularly well equipped to deal with a visual representation along these lines (see Grady, 2007). 
As Semino puts it:  
Cognitive metaphor theorists emphasize that target domains typically correspond 
to areas of experience that are relatively abstract, complex, unfamiliar, subjective 
or poorly delineated, such as time, emotion, life or death. In contrast, source 
domains typically correspond to concrete, simple, familiar, physical and well-
delineated experiences, such as motion, bodily phenomena, physical objects and 
so on (2008: 6). 
This is precisely what happens in BBDO’s visual metaphor, which brings together an abstract target 
(scientific models of climate change) and a directly perceptible, quotidian source (the melting ice 
cream), with the source being used to illuminate the target and make it more intelligible. Steen, 
another metaphor theorist, calls this the ‘perspective-changing’ function of metaphor: ‘I propose 
that a metaphor is used deliberately when it is expressly meant to change the addressee’s 
perspective on the referent or topic that is the target of the metaphor, by making the addressee 
look at it from a different conceptual domain or space, which functions as a conceptual source’ 
(2008: 222). 
Societal and scientific discourse on climate change makes extensive use of metaphorical language 
(see Nerlich and Jaspal, 2012; Skinnemoen, 2009). Think about the phrase ‘greenhouse effect,’ which 
equates the action of certain gases in the Earth’s atmosphere to heat retention in a human-made 
structure. Once such metaphors become conventional, they tend to lose their affective and 
perspective-changing value: as part of scientific language, ‘greenhouse effect’ evokes none of the 
emotional associations of the melting ice cream visual metaphor. This is where literature may offer a 
useful resource for climate change discourse more generally. Literature has long been associated 
with stylistic foregrounding—that is, unconventional rhetorical devices, including creative metaphor, 
that depart from everyday language use and therefore promise to revitalize it (Miall and Kuiken, 
1994; Short, 1996: 9–13). Goatly’s statistical survey confirms that ‘active’ (i.e., unconventional) 
metaphors are more frequent in literary genres such as novels and poems than in other discourse 
types (see Goatly, 2011: 320–326). Arguably, these creative metaphors are particularly effective at 
exploiting the perspective-changing potential of metaphor in general (Caracciolo, 2017). Because the 
combination of source and target domain is novel and emotionally impactful, readers’ viewpoint on 
the target is more likely to be affected by literary metaphors than by more conventional ones.3  
Taking these ideas as a point of departure, this article offers a systematic analysis of metaphorical 
patterns in three novels that grapple with the spectre of an ecological catastrophe: Margaret 
Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003), Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods (2007), and Ian McEwan’s 
Solar (2010). These novels belong to the macro-genre that Trexler (2015) has named ‘Anthropocene 
fiction,’ where ‘Anthropocene’ is the term coined by chemist Paul Crutzen in the early 2000s for the 
current geological era: one in which humankind has become a quasi-geological agent capable of 
shaping the climate future of our planet (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). For Trexler, who builds on 
current work in ecocriticism, Anthropocene fiction stages and questions humankind’s interrelation 
with the nonhuman realities of the ecology, the climate, and the geological history of our planet. 
This kind of fiction shows the human and the nonhuman to be intimately bound up, so that it is no 
longer possible to see humankind as metaphysically privileged (see also Grusin, 2015).   
This article argues that metaphor is a uniquely powerful tool in revealing this interrelation, by 
bridging human experience and a wide gamut of nonhuman realities, such as the life of animals, the 
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dynamics of ecosystems, or climatological and geological processes. The melting Earth visual 
metaphor operates in this way: it presents global warming as a process in which human agency 
(expressed by the familiar image of the ice cream) is inextricably bound up with the more-than-
human (the planet). Likewise, in the verbal domain, metaphor can challenge dualistic distinctions—
for instance, between human agents and supposedly inert nonhuman objects—that are built into 
language itself. As Goatly puts it, ‘metaphor is, par excellence, the means of de/reconstructing 
common-sense ordinary language categories’ (1996: 557). Literary fiction holds particular promise in 
this respect, in that it can enhance the defamiliarizing power of metaphorical language by deploying 
clusters of semantically related metaphors (for detailed discussion, see Semino, 2008: 24–25). These 
‘extended’ metaphors are conceptually and affectively resonant in ways that would be difficult to 
achieve through a single metaphorical mapping. Put otherwise, metaphors in literary narrative can 
coalesce into what Martens and Biebuyck (2013) call a metaphorical ‘paranarrative,’ which 
complicates and extends the meanings at play in a plot. If, as we posited above, Anthropocene 
fiction probes the divide between human societies and the nonhuman world, metaphorical 
paranarratives can modulate the stakes and effects of such probing. In our approach to the three 
novels we focus on the emergence of metaphorical paranarratives and their interaction with other, 
non-metaphorical narrative devices. Our core hypotheses are, thus, that creative metaphorical 
language is central to the anti-anthropocentric project of Anthropocene fiction; and that, conversely, 
the import of metaphorical patterns can only be understood in the context of broader narrative 
strategies, which we examine through close engagement with the novels by Atwood, Winterson, and 
McEwan. Via—respectively—their irony, temporal and thematic loops, and exploration of grotesque 
embodiment, these novels serve as blueprints for complexifying and deepening everyday discourse 
on climate change.  
In a recent discussion of metaphor and climate change, David Ritchie points to the dangers of 
metaphors becoming too entrenched in the language of both pro-environmental politicians and 
climate change sceptics. For Ritchie, recurring metaphorical phrases such as global warming as a 
‘time bomb’ or ‘alarmist computer models’ lead to the polarization of the debate: ‘the dramatic 
metaphorical stories used by advocates on each side of the debate . . . are likely to be ignored, 
discredited, or dismissed by those who are convinced of the opposite position’ (2017: 214). The 
multiplicity of the metaphorical mappings we reveal across the three novels offers an illustration of 
how literary fiction can resist this reification and conventionalization of metaphor. Our analysis 
demonstrates the richness of metaphor’s engagement with the nonhuman in the context of literary 
fiction—a richness that takes a different form in each of the three case studies, reflecting the 
specifics of the interaction between metaphorical strategies, style, and narrative. These 
complexities, we claim, channel humankind’s multifaceted entanglement with the nonhuman more 
adequately and insightfully than the ‘dramatic’ (but largely conventional) ‘metaphorical stories’ of 
contemporary politics. 
We take on board the notion—central to conceptual metaphor theory—that metaphorical language 
involves a specific ‘orientation,’ from a source to a target domain. The target is the focus of the 
metaphor—the person, object, or situation we seek to shed new light on—while the source is the 
person, object, or situation that is being used to reveal an aspect of the target. Potentially, this 
orientation implies a hierarchical or at least an evaluative relation: for instance, ‘that man is a dog’ 
has vastly different connotations from ‘that dog is a man.’ The mapping from an animal (source) to a 
human (target) in the first sentence is demeaning and disempowering, while the mapping with the 
opposite orientation (human source, animal target) works towards collapsing the difference 
between human and animal life. This is but an extremely simple example of how the orientation of 
metaphor influences meaning generation. The novels we analyse over the next pages are much 
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more sophisticated in their use of orientation, based on two factors: whether the human functions 
as source or target of the metaphor; and how each metaphorical mapping interacts with the larger 
stylistic and narrative context, including other metaphorical clusters.  
In our view, the flexibility of conceptual metaphor theory in the Lakoff and Johnson tradition is 
particularly well suited to account for the dynamic interaction between narrative and clusters of 
metaphorical language. In a systematic discussion of this interaction, Popova (2015: 95–115) also 
builds on Lakoff and Johnson’s work to account for metaphor’s ‘specific contributions to the causal 
structuring of a story’ (2015: 113)—what we’ve referred to as the ‘paranarrative.’ Popova argues 
against newer approaches to the study of metaphor, particularly Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) 
‘blending theory,’ suggesting that the concept of blending is too broad-ranging to capture the 
complex interplay of narrative and metaphorical language. Fauconnier and Turner posit that 
metaphors are not simple mappings between conceptual domains but operate via the integration of 
these domains, which takes place in a mental space that Fauconnier and Turner call a ‘blend.’ While 
Popova’s objections to blending theory are substantive, our decision to stick with conceptual 
metaphor theory is based on methodological considerations. Blending is convincingly exemplified by 
the coherent metaphorical scenarios scrutinized by Fauconnier and Turner, but it is far more difficult 
to observe in a systematic analysis of a relatively large corpus: most of the time, the metaphorical 
mappings we discuss display a specific orientation without resulting in a global blend. The concept of 
‘blending’ thus makes concrete metaphor analysis more cumbersome than conceptual metaphor 
theory, detracting from the heuristic value of the metaphor identification exercise we perform in 
this article. In the next two sections we expand on our selection of this corpus and on issues of 
methodology. 
The Corpus 
The three novels we analyse in this article are significant works pertaining to Anthropocene fiction; 
all of them have won critical acclaim and have been discussed from an ecocritical perspective 
(Garrard, 2013; Ionescu, 2017; Merola, 2014; Snyder, 2011; Zemanek, 2012). The first instalment in 
the popular MaddAddam series, Atwood’s Oryx and Crake envisages a dystopian world in which 
humanity is wiped out by a mysterious epidemic. As we discover in the course of the novel, this virus 
was synthesized in a lab, as the combined result of deranged science and corporate greed. The way 
in which the landscape is altered by human exploitation—and, later, by the disappearance of human 
beings—resonates with present-day anxieties about climate change. Despite this post-apocalyptic 
gloom, Atwood’s narrative is highly readable and rich in irony as it traces the backstory of its 
protagonist, who initially appears to be the last human left on Earth.  
Winterson’s The Stone Gods eschews linearity in favour of mythical overtones. Winterson’s approach 
is also more self-consciously literary than Atwood’s: for instance, the novel builds on a large number 
of intertextual references to Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as well as John Donne’s poetry. The 
Stone Gods suggests that every civilization is bound to cause its own demise through the mindless 
exploitation of natural resources, in a loop that has been repeated (and will be repeated) countless 
times in cosmic history. Billie, the narrator and protagonist, experiences this cyclicity first-hand as 
she is sent to a distant planet, known as Planet Blue, to recreate the civilization that is failing on 
Earth. 
Finally, McEwan’s Solar paints a largely satirical portrait of its protagonist, a Nobel prize-winning 
physicist. The more-than-human scale of climate change here serves to throw into sharp relief the 
pettiness of a scientist more interested in women and junk food than in scientific problems. Yet the 
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novel succeeds in conveying the deep interrelation between the climate, politics, and the personal 
lives of the scientists working to understand and potentially prevent climate change.  
While certainly not exhaustive, these novels are representative of three different strands in 
Anthropocene fiction: first, work that grows out of science fiction and retains a clear connection to 
this genre (Atwood’s Oryx and Crake; other examples include Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl and 
Kim Stanley Robinson’s Forty Signs of Rain); second, work that reflects a mainstream ‘literary’ 
novelist’s engagement with dystopian motifs (Winterson’s The Stone Gods; other examples include 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road and Colson Whitehead’s Zone One); and, finally, work by major 
novelists that explores human-nonhuman entanglements in a realistic setting (McEwan’s Solar; 
other examples include Barbara Kingsolver’s Flight Behaviour and Richard Powers’s The Echo Maker). 
Our three case studies thus exemplify the complex positioning of Anthropocene fiction in the 
landscape of the contemporary novel.  
Methodology 
In our analysis of metaphorical language in the three novels we followed Kimmel’s (2008) approach, 
which combines qualitative coding with computer-aided analysis. However, unlike Kimmel, and in 
accordance with the theoretical agenda outlined in the introduction, we restricted our focus to a 
subset of metaphors: namely, metaphorical language that stages the entanglement of human life 
and nonhuman realities. In order to operationalize this idea, we identified three semantic domains 
that feed into the umbrella concept of the nonhuman: inanimate objects and structures (to which 
we assigned the code O); living nonhuman creatures and biological processes in living creatures 
(coded as LN); and inanimate natural elements and processes (such as geological or topographical 
features of the landscape, meteorological phenomena, and so on; coded as W, for ‘world’).4 The 
authors proceeded to identify all metaphorical expressions in the novels that involve at least one of 
these categories. The identification was performed at sentence, not at lexical, level: if semantically 
related metaphors occurred in the same sentence, they were considered as one metaphorical unit in 
order to avoid excessive fragmentation in the data.5 Metaphors proper as well as similes were taken 
into account, based on the assumption that they both rely on the same cognitive principle of 
‘mapping’ or comparison across semantic domains (Michael et al., 2005). Conventional metaphors 
(e.g., ‘her voice was as bright as ever’; McEwan, 2010: 11) were not taken into account, unless they 
interacted with the surrounding text in a way that significantly undercut their conventionality. The 
rationale for this choice was that, as explained in the introduction, creative metaphors hold the 
greatest potential for unsettling entrenched notions of human separation from the nonhuman 
world, especially via their emotional impact. A metaphor was considered conventional when it was 
judged to be in line with everyday language use, for instance because the metaphorical meaning 
already appears in a standard dictionary definition of the term (as in the case of ‘bright’ = ‘distinct 
and vibrant’).6 
In a further step, we coded these metaphorical expressions by assigning the following tags in 
addition to the already mentioned O, LN, and W: LH (for ‘living human’) for references to persons, 
parts of the human body, or biological processes occurring in the human body; A for abstract 
concepts such as those associated with social practices (e.g., religion or art) or institutions (e.g., 
politics or marriage); and P for psychological states (sensations and feelings, or cognitive functions 
such as memory or the imagination). For instance, the sentence ‘[the women Jimmy encountered] 
were so emotionally starved even [he] avoided them as if they were quagmires,’ from Oryx and 
Crake (Atwood, 2003: 292), was coded as LH and W on account of the final simile ‘as if they were 
quagmires,’ which compares human beings (LH) to a natural landscape (W). By contrast, the equally 
metaphorical expression ‘emotionally starved’ was not tagged because it only involves a comparison 
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between biological processes in the human body (LH) and psychological experience (P), and thus 
does not address the nonhuman in any significant way.  
We can see these codes as falling on two different sliding scales. The first measures conceptual 
distance from the human world: LH, A, and P are central to this world, while LN and W point to a 
nonhuman alterity (in the form of other animal species, LN, or inanimate natural processes, W). 
Objects (O) fall halfway between these conceptual poles, in that they occupy a more ambiguous 
position: they are closely bound up with human cultures, but they can also serve to destabilize 
anthropocentric worldviews, especially as far as advanced technology (e.g., artificial intelligence) is 
concerned. Posthumanist thinking, for instance, focuses on technological artefacts as a challenge to 
traditional humanism (see Hayles, 2017; Wolfe, 2010). For this reason, we consider objects 
‘nonhuman’ for the purpose of quantifying metaphor usage in the next section; however, the 
ambivalent role of human-made objects is more fully reflected in our case studies. An alternative 
way of conceptualizing the relationship between these codes is via the so-called ‘animacy hierarchy’ 
(Croft, 2002: 130) or ‘animacy scale’ (Yamamoto, 1999: 9–10), which ranks nouns on the basis of the 
degree of animacy (or sentience) they imply: LH and P involve a maximum of animacy, nonhuman 
animals (LN) display some degree of animacy, while objects, natural processes, and abstract 
concepts display none. Yamamoto notes that this scale is in itself ‘a product of anthropocentric 
human cognition’ (1999: 9) as well as—we may add—of entrenched cultural assumptions in a 
Western context. Metaphorical language can unsettle these assumptions by ascribing animacy and 
even agency to objects and processes normally thought of as inanimate. 
For each of the relevant metaphorical expressions in the corpus novels, a target and a source 
domain were identified, and the orientation of the metaphorical mapping was thus established (in 
the case of ‘as if they were quagmires,’ this mapping was represented as ‘W → LH,’ meaning that W 
is the source of the metaphor, LH is the target domain). The main limitation of this approach is that 
it forces metaphorical expressions into a source-target grid and does not account for ambiguity or 
additional meanings created by the context. For instance, in The Stone Gods we read the following: 
‘Had I lordship of the Universe I should roll men like marbles in the pan of space’ (Winterson, 2009: 
Kindle Locations 1973-1974). ‘Roll men like marbles’ is a simile of the form O → LH, while ‘pan of 
space’ is a metaphor O → W. However, this tagging does not reflect the fact that, in the reader’s 
experience, the references to the universe and space confer a cosmic quality to the ‘men as marbles’ 
simile as well. We decided not to code these supplemental connotations, because they would have 
greatly complicated the task of quantifying the metaphorical expressions across the novels. But we 
take into account these ambiguities fully in the qualitative analysis that follows. The quantitative 
analysis is thus to be seen as a heuristic tool, supporting our interpretive engagement with the 
novels rather than replacing it entirely. 
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the absolute and relative frequency of the main metaphorical types across 
the three novels, and the relative frequency of each type per novel.7 This means that, for instance, O 
→ LH metaphors occur 145 times in the corpus, representing 13.44% of the total metaphor usage 
across the novels. O → LH mappings amount to 15.22% of the metaphors we identified in Oryx and 
Crake, 12.80% of the metaphors in The Stone Gods, and 12.20% of the metaphors in Solar. As 
pointed out in the previous section, only mappings that involve nonhuman objects (O), animals, 
plants, and organic processes (LN), or natural elements (W) are listed. Table 1 presents the mappings 
with human-related targets (LH, A, and P), while Table 2 focuses on nonhuman-related targets (W, 
LN, and O). 
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Metaphorical 
types: 
human as 
target 
AF 
across 
the 
novels 
RF 
across 
the 
novels 
Oryx and 
Crake (RF 
per novel) 
The Stone 
Gods (RF 
per novel) 
Solar (RF 
per novel) 
O → LH 145 13.44 15.22 12.80 12.20 
LN → LH 131 12.14 19.02 9.60 7.44 
O → A 101 9.36 8.15 5.60 14.88 
O → P 86 7.97 13.59 1.60 8.93 
W → LH 53 4.91 2.17 8.27 4.17 
W → P 40 3.71 4.08 1.87 5.36 
W → A 35 3.24 1.90 2.13 5.95 
LN → P 24 2.22 4.62 1.07 0.89 
LN → A 18 1.67 1.63 0.80 2.68 
Total 633 58.66 70.38 43.74 62.50 
 
    
Table 1: Main metaphorical types across the three novels, human as target domain. AF = absolute 
frequency, RF = relative frequency (in %).  
Metaphorical 
types: 
nonhuman 
as target 
AF 
across 
the 
novels 
RF 
across 
the 
novels 
Oryx and 
Crake (RF 
per novel) 
The Stone 
Gods (RF 
per novel) 
Solar (RF 
per novel) 
O → W 71 6.58 3.53 8.53 7.74 
O → O8 47 4.36 5.16 4.53 3.27 
LN → W 42 3.89 0.82 8.27 2.38 
O → LN 40 3.71 5.16 5.07 0.60 
LH → W 37 3.43 1.09 5.33 3.87 
LH → O 29 2.69 1.36 2.67 4.17 
LN → O 26 2.41 1.36 2.93 2.98 
W → O 19 1.76 2.45 1.33 1.49 
LN → LN 17 1.58 3.26 1.33 0.00 
A → W 16 1.48 0.00 3.73 0.60 
P → W 15 1.39 0.00 3.20 0.89 
P → O 11 1.02 0.00 0.80 2.38 
Total 370 34.30 24.19 47.72 30.37 
 
    
Table 2: Main metaphorical types across the three novels, nonhuman as target domain. AF = 
absolute frequency, RF = relative frequency (in %).  
In the following sections, we use these quantitative results to trace the broader metaphorical 
paranarratives at play in the novels, analysing how metaphorical clusters interact with the plot and 
other stylistic and narrative strategies. 
Objectification and Irony in Oryx and Crake 
The four most frequent mappings in Oryx and Crake (LN → LH, O → LH, O → P, and O → A) have LH, 
P, or A as a target domain, alone making up more than 50% of the metaphors we identified in the 
novel. Because, as argued above, these categories are closely bound up with human subjectivity and 
culture, this is a strong indication that in this novel the human gravitates towards the target position. 
This impression is confirmed if we look at The Stone Gods and Solar, where the human also tends to 
take the target position, but less significantly than in Oryx and Crake (with a relative frequency of 
70.38% vs. 62.50% in Solar; The Stone Gods has 43.74%). Thus, among the most common mappings 
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(relative frequency higher than 7%) in Winterson’s and McEwan’s novels there is at least one type in 
which the target is W (O → W and LH → W in The Stone Gods, O → W in Solar). On the other hand, in 
both Oryx and Crake and Solar the most frequent mappings have either O or LN as a source domain, 
with LN ranking first in Atwood’s novel.  
Here are some examples from Oryx and Crake, one for each of the top four mappings: ‘Snowman, 
please tell us—what is that moss growing out of your face?’ (LN → LH; Atwood, 2003: 9); ‘What she 
reminded him of at such times was a porcelain sink: clear, shining, hard’ (O → LH; 2003: 36); 
‘Another baffling item on the cryptic report card his mother toted around in some mental pocket’ (O 
→ P; 2003: 80); ‘the vital arts and their irresistible reserved seat in the big red-velvet amphitheatre 
of the beating human heart’ (O → A; 2003: 219). The human body, mind (‘mental pocket’), and even 
a core component of human culture (the arts), are objectified or reduced to biological forms (the 
‘moss’) widely seen as inert and therefore object-like. But, as these examples suggest, Atwood’s 
mappings work differently from a common use of objectification, whereby humans belonging to a 
minority group are relegated to a subordinate role and thus denied autonomy and subjectivity (see, 
e.g., Papadaki, 2010). In fact, the salient feature of virtually all these mappings is that they ‘demote’ 
humans by comparing them to things and objects that rank lower on the animacy scale (such as 
‘moss,’ a ‘porcelain sink,’ a ‘pocket,’ or a ‘seat’). The effect of this demotion is distinctly ironic and 
sets Oryx and Crake apart from the other two novels.9 We build here on Currie’s theory of irony as a 
form of perspective-taking:  
[The] ironist’s utterance [is] an indication that he or she is pretending to have a 
limited or otherwise defective perspective, point of view, or stance F, and in 
doing so puts us in mind of some perspective, point of view, or stance (which 
may be identical to F or merely resemble it) which is the target of the ironic 
comment (2010: 157).10 
Atwood’s metaphors take the perspective of someone equating human subjectivity and culture to 
inanimate objects, which is evidently a ‘defective’ point of view insofar as it clashes with ingrained 
ideas of ‘the human’ with a capital h. The incongruity generated by this conceptual clash is at the 
root of Atwood’s irony, which performs what we may think of self-deprecating humour on a species 
level: via the objectifying paranarrative, a human author mocks the presumed metaphysical primacy 
of humankind for the benefit of her human audience.  
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this strategy is a pervasive metaphorical cluster comparing 
human beings to food (resulting in a loss of animacy). In the final pages of the novel, the protagonist, 
Snowman, makes a desperate attempt at scavenging the research facility in which the deadly virus 
was first synthesized. The reason for this risky foray is that Snowman is running out of food, which 
creates an archetypical narrative situation: food becomes the object of Snowman’s quest. At the 
level of plot, the nonhuman is thus subordinated to the human and instrumentalized. But the 
metaphorical paranarrative reverses this situation, since the human body is repeatedly turned into 
the target of metaphorical mappings that use food as the source. For instance, Snowman thinks: 
‘[Like] a horse, his life now depends on [his ability to use his feet to walk]. If he can’t walk, he’s rat 
food’ (2003: 270). Noteworthy here is the metaphorical progression from LN → LH (‘like a horse’) to 
O → LH (‘he’s rat food’), which performs a two-step demotion of the narrative’s human protagonist 
along the animacy scale: from human being to animate nonhuman creature to inanimate substance. 
Later, we read that the vultures were ‘waiting for him to be meat’ (2003: 416), or—in a more 
elaborate variation, with an element of P—that ‘his foot feels like a gigantic boiled wiener stuffed 
with hot, masticated flesh, boneless and about to burst’ (2003: 389). These metaphorical mappings 
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serve the ironic purpose of destabilizing the distinction between human flesh and animal meat, thus 
feeding into the novel’s broader critique of anthropocentrism. Furthermore, the metaphors dislodge 
the human from the agentive subject position that it still retains in the plot. Importantly, the irony 
implicit in these metaphors is not just the result of a narratorial stance but the reflection of the 
protagonist’s self-deprecating humour, so that Snowman serves as a diegetic embodiment of the 
anti-anthropocentric worldview articulated by the novel as a whole.11 
Nowhere does this metaphorical critique become more evident than in the novel’s conclusion. Here 
Snowman manages to escape from the research facility in which his childhood friend, Crake, has 
concocted the virus that caused humanity’s demise. Crake died in the facility, and his bones are still 
there, ‘mingled and in disarray, like a giant jigsaw puzzle’ (with an O → LH mapping; 2003: 391). 
Snowman makes his way back to the village inhabited by so-called ‘Crakers,’ the new human species 
genetically engineered by Crake to be immortal and immune to the deadly epidemic (but also 
simple-minded and incapable of sophisticated cultural expression). Upon Snowman’s return, the 
Crakers ask him whether they can meet their creator, whom Snowman has been depicting so far 
(quite truthfully, at least as far as the Crakers are concerned) as a divine figure. That of the 
emotionally charged encounter between a creature and its maker is a classic trope of science fiction, 
going back at least to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. Atwood gives it an ironic twist: Snowman 
remembers Crake’s bones and remarks that the Crakers are not allowed to meet him, because he 
has ‘turned himself into a plant.’ To which one of the Crakers, who eat a vegetarian diet, responds: 
‘Why would Crake become food?’ (2003: 421). 
Crake, the scientist who embodies a dream (soon turned into a nightmare) of technological mastery 
over the nonhuman world, is literally metamorphosed into unrecognizable bones, and symbolically 
into a plant and mere ‘food.’ This exchange between Snowman and the Crakers marks the 
emergence into the novel’s plot of the metaphorical paranarrative that questions the distinction 
between human beings and food, and—more generally—the divide between humans, other life 
forms, and inanimate objects: Crake himself thus becomes the target of Atwood’s ironic narration, 
just as humankind had been the regular target of the narrator’s metaphorical mappings. Unlike 
Crake, Snowman becomes poignantly aware of the thin line that separates our species from 
nonhuman realities: remember the simile that captures the experience of his aching foot by 
comparing it to a ‘gigantic boiled wiener’—in itself an image rich in humorous overtones.12 Through 
the persona of the likable, irony-prone protagonist, Atwood’s novel offers readers the chance to 
develop a similar awareness of the continuum between human and nonhuman realities.  
Metaphorical Loops in The Stone Gods 
As we observed in the previous section, metaphorical mappings in The Stone Gods present a less 
linear picture than in Oryx and Crake, where 70.38% of the metaphors have the human as a target 
domain. In Winterson’s novel, by contrast, that percentage is much lower (43.74%). Indeed, three of 
the most frequent types (O → W, LN → W, and LH → W) place inanimate natural processes in the 
target position, making up over 20% of the total mappings. Here are some examples for each of 
these types: ‘The sky exploded in grenades of colour’ (O → W; Winterson, 2009: Kindle Location 
3655); ‘one star just visible like the bud of a horn’ (LN → W; 2009: Kindle Location 2291); ‘strands of 
rock, splintered out from the surface like thick plaits of hair’ (LH → W; 2009: Kindle Location 1011). 
These passages inscribe visual forms associated with the human body (hair), technology (grenades), 
or living beings (a horn) into astronomical or geological phenomena. This strategy goes hand in hand 
with the explicit anthropomorphization of the nonhuman, in relatively common mappings such as A 
→ W (3.73%) and P → W (3.20%): for instance, ‘there must be planets that are their own mistakes—
stories that began and faltered’ (A → W; 2009: Kindle Location 1777), where the abstract notions 
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‘mistakes’ and ‘stories’ are projected onto planets. A similar case is the ascription of psychological 
qualities onto inanimate landscapes: ‘The petrified forest is there—carbonized tree remains, held in 
the heat, we don’t know how, like a memory’ (P → W; 2009: Kindle Location 1071) and ‘the 
Pennines that held the towns like a memory’ (P → W; 2009: Kindle Location 2468). A → W and P → 
W mappings are absent in Oryx and Crake and extremely infrequent (< 1%) in Solar, highlighting the 
distinctiveness of Winterson’s approach to metaphor. In contrast to Oryx and Crake, in which the 
objectifying paranarrative tends to collapse the human into nonhuman elements, The Stone Gods 
makes extensive use of metaphors that ‘promote’ the nonhuman to a higher position on the 
animacy scale—that of a minded agent.  
One of the most self-conscious uses of this anthropomorphizing strategy builds on the quotation of a 
line from Donne’s poem ‘The Sun Rising,’ which recurs, like a leitmotif, throughout the novel. The 
line reads: ‘She is all States, all Princes I.’ Donne’s conceit was to compare his lover to ‘all States’ 
(i.e., all countries on Earth), and himself to ‘all Princes,’ suggesting that their romantic union is as 
complete and metaphysically sovereign as the planet itself. In terms of the coding system adopted in 
this article, Donne’s metaphor could be construed as W → LH, since the image of the Earth is 
leveraged to shed light on the poet’s feelings towards his lover. However, Winterson puts a vastly 
different spin on this metaphor, employing it to characterize not a human lover but an actual planet, 
known as ‘Planet Blue,’ a promised land in which humanity could supposedly rebuild civilization from 
the ashes of the Earth’s environmental exploitation. In the following scene, for instance, the narrator 
is on a spaceship, hurtling towards Planet Blue with a handful of settlers: ‘“To Planet Blue,” [the 
captain] said, raising his glass, and there on the diode screen was the picture of our new world, and 
underneath: She is all States, all Princes I’ (2009: Kindle Locations 962-964; italics in the original). The 
planet is thus endowed with human-like qualities, which make it worthy of the poet’s (and the 
captain’s) love. But this personification is caught in a sophisticated intertextual dance, in which the 
lover and the planet swap metaphorical positions (W → LH in Donne, LH → W in Winterson), evoking 
a sense of circularity between the human and the nonhuman.  
In fact, this impression of circularity is consistent with Winterson’s metaphor usage in The Stone 
Gods, where the mappings tend to travel in both directions, from the human to a nonhuman target 
(47.72% of the metaphors) and back from the nonhuman to a human target (43.74% of the 
metaphors). We have been emphasizing mappings where W takes the target position so far, but 
types such as LN → LH or W → LH are also present in the novel. In some cases these mappings 
objectify the human body, introducing an ironic distance comparable to the humour of Atwood’s 
novel: ‘All men are hung like whales. All women are tight as clams below’ (LN → LH; 2009: Kindle 
Location 343). But more significant are metaphors in which—just as in Donne’s poem—astronomical 
or geological references serve to transfigure and enchant the human body: ‘These are men 
glamorous as comets, trailing fame in firetails’ (W → LH; 2009: Kindle Location 79). W → LH 
mappings are far more frequent in The Stone Gods (8.27%) than in Atwood’s and McEwan’s novels 
(2.17% and 4.17% respectively). Winterson’s metaphors appear to seek a balance between the 
human as source and the human as target, and the result is that the embodied self and the material 
world meet halfway in the metaphorical paranarrative, as suggested by the symmetry of this 
passage: ‘Kiss me. Your mouth is a cave. This cave is your mouth’ (2009: Kindle Location 1880). 
Crucially, this loop-like logic extends far beyond the novel’s metaphor usage. The Stone Gods 
embraces a philosophy of history reminiscent of Vico’s (1999) cyclical account of the rise and fall of 
civilizations. In Winterson’s novel, this process is determined by the depletion of natural resources 
and—ultimately—by humanity’s greed. This circularity underlies the narrative, in that similar 
situations and even passages (such as the Donne quotation) recur at different moments in the 
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novel’s chronology. In an instance of mise en abyme, the novel even recursively (and self-
reflectively) contains a version of itself. The narrator claims to have found a manuscript titled The 
Stone Gods on a train, later adding that she had left it there herself: ‘“What’s that?” Spike asked. 
“It’s what I told you about, today, yesterday, when, I don’t know when, it seems a lifetime ago. The 
Stone Gods.” “I wonder who left it there?” “It was me.” “Why, Billie?” A message in a bottle. A 
signal. But then I saw it was still there . . . round and round on the Circle Line. A repeating world’ 
(2009: 3879–3885; ellipsis in the original). The image of the circle pervades the novel, at multiple 
levels: diegetic, temporal, and thematic. But only the metaphorical paranarrative reveals the deep 
significance of this circularity: it holds a mirror up to Winterson’s fluidly circular metaphysics, in 
which the human, embodied subject seeps into, and is at the same time shaped by, the nonhuman 
realities of geology and the cosmos. 
Climate Change, the Body, and Satire in Solar 
The most frequent mapping in Solar is O → A, which is present in the other novels as well, but much 
less common (14.88% vs. 8.15% and 5.60%). Table 1 reveals that 23.51% of the novel’s total 
mappings have abstract ideas as a target domain, a considerably higher percentage than in either 
Oryx and Crake (11.68%) or The Stone Gods (8.53%). This tendency clearly goes hand in hand with 
the fact that the novel’s protagonist is a scientist who tends to think in abstract terms. As Elena 
Semino and Kate Swindlehurst argue in a seminal article (Semino and Swindlehurst, 1996), recurrent 
metaphorical mappings contribute to the textual evocation of a character’s distinctive mind style. 
Superficially, this would seem to be the case for McEwan’s portrait of Michael Beard, the Nobel 
prize-winning physicist who occupies the foreground of Solar. Yet if we take a closer look at the 
metaphors deployed by McEwan, it is sometimes hard to tell where the character’s bias towards 
abstract concepts ends and where the narrator’s satire begins. Consider, for instance, the following 
extended metaphor of the O → A type: ‘Theoretical physics was a village, and on its green, by the 
village pump, Beard still had influence’ (2010: 97). This comparison conflates an abstract target (the 
academic field of theoretical physics) with a human-scale village. The passage reflects Beard’s belief 
that he retains some leverage on his colleagues, despite having made extremely limited 
contributions to science after the discovery that led to the Nobel prize. However, the use of the 
village as a source domain is hardly flattering and unlikely to originate in the character’s thought 
processes. In fact, the quotation suggests that theoretical physics, for all its high-flown ambitions, is 
a parochial world; it thus develops McEwan’s critique of scientific institutions and their ability to 
prevent an ecological catastrophe—one of the novel’s main thematic concerns. 
Many of McEwan’s metaphors belong to this ambivalent grey zone between mind style and satire. 
Another example foregrounds Beard’s uneasy personal life: ‘Weren’t marriages, his marriages, tidal, 
with one rolling out just before another rolled in? But this one was different’ (2010: 3). Here the 
target is an abstract idea (Beard’s attitude towards marriage, A), the source a natural phenomenon 
(the tides, W). This metaphorical mapping is far more frequent in Solar (5.95%) than in Oryx and 
Crake (1.90%) and The Stone Gods (2.13%). In this particular instance, the ‘tidal’ metaphor would 
seem to express Beard’s jaded understanding of his romantic life on the basis of an analogy with the 
nonhuman world, and yet the overall effect is mostly humorous, in that it contradicts expectations 
of long-term stability and commitment associated with marriage. McEwan’s satire is thus quite 
different from the self-deprecating irony of Snowman in Oryx and Crake: while Snowman’s ironic 
comparisons between the human body and food play into Atwood’s anti-anthropocentric project, so 
that the protagonist and the novel appear to be on the same wavelength, McEwan’s satire operates 
to a large extent against the grain of the protagonist. As readers, we have to work out McEwan’s 
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engagement with climate change while juggling the protagonist’s perspective and the novel’s 
satirical overtones. 
As we have suggested and critics such as Garrard (2013) have argued in detail, McEwan articulates a 
critique of scientific institutions, which appear unable to deal with or communicate adequately the 
scale of anthropogenic climate change. Beard becomes the prime target of this satirical attack. Yet—
and herein lies the novel’s main complexity—McEwan also assigns his protagonist a more positive 
role, by using his somatic experience as a probe into the nonhuman realities of the climate. The 
implication is that the body might be capable of addressing the shortcomings of scientific thinking 
and establishing a connection between humans and the environment. Once again, this work of 
bridge-building is performed by the metaphorical language that runs through Solar and complicates 
the narrative of Beard’s personal as well as professional life.  
Quantitatively, mappings that involve the human body (LH) as either a source or a target are not 
more frequent in Solar than in our other case studies. But they take on extra interpretive significance 
as the novel explores Beard’s grotesque embodiment. In fact, just as his marriages are ‘tidal,’ his 
experience of the body is governed by forces that the novel portrays through a set of W → LH 
mappings. Consider this passage, for instance: ‘He went home to his flat and lay brooding in the 
scum-rimmed bath, gazing through steam clouds at the archipelago of his disrupted selfhood—
mountainous paunch, penis tip, unruly toes—scattered in a line across a soapy gray sea’ (2010: 164). 
Beard’s body is here compared to a landscape, whose jagged features mirror—with a further W → P 
mapping—his mental state of dejection and confusion. It is unclear whether this analogy should be 
attributed to the character or to the narrator; yet, as readers hesitate between Beard’s mental 
perspective and the narrator’s possibly satirical intentions, the body itself gains prominence and 
becomes a focus of attention in its own right. In this way, the novel’s ambivalence brings to the fore 
an embodied channel of communication, perhaps even of communion, with the nonhuman world. 
One pivotal scene highlights this embodied connection between Beard and the environment. He is 
about to deliver a keynote speech at a conference in London, addressing an audience of 
‘institutional investors, pension-fund managers, solid types who would not easily be persuaded that 
the world, their world, was in danger’ (2010: 129). Suddenly, Beard feels sick:  
[As Beard] took his place behind the lectern, gripping tightly its edges in both 
hands, he felt an oily nausea at something monstrous and rotten from the sea 
stranded on the tidal mudflats of a stagnant estuary, decaying gaseously in his 
gut and welling up, contaminating his breath, his words, and suddenly his 
thoughts. ‘The planet,’ he said, surprising himself, ‘is sick.’ (2010: 170–171) 
The passage builds on an LN → P metaphor in which Beard’s queasiness is compared to decaying 
organic matter emerging from the sea, a parallel further extended into the mapping between the 
recesses of his body and a natural landscape (W → LH). Two words, ‘oily’ and ‘contaminated,’ 
denote Beard’s experience but inevitably link this landscape to the exploitation of natural resources 
(‘oil,’ a word that Beard will use to refer to petroleum a few lines below) and environmental 
contamination. This complex metaphorical strategy establishes a connection between natural 
processes and bodily experience, which Beard himself explicitly acknowledges by declaring the 
planet ‘sick’ in his opening remark. Here the key phrase is ‘surprising himself’: the embodied route to 
the nonhuman bypasses Beard’s conscious appraisal of the ecological crisis (which—the novel 
implies—he never felt strongly about, jumping on the environmentalist bandwagon only out of 
narcissistic self-interest). 
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The link between the planet’s metaphorical sickness and Beard’s embodiment emerges again in the 
novel’s ending, in which he discovers that the ‘reddish brown blotch’ (2010: 276) on his wrist is a 
potentially life-threatening melanoma, described through another W → LH mapping (‘a map of 
unknown territory’; 2010: 276). Through this plot device and the metaphorical patterns that 
accompany it, the parallel between Beard’s body and the ecological crisis comes into the open. This 
conclusion suggests that Beard is more than a satirical butt in McEwan’s critique of the scientific 
community’s shortcomings. The protagonist becomes an unlikely, and to a large extent 
unsuspecting, embodiment of climate change—where the word ‘embodiment’ refers to Beard’s 
actual body, not to a merely conceptual or symbolic connection with the environment. By 
developing a metaphorical paranarrative through the character’s somatic experience, McEwan 
gestures towards an understanding of human-nonhuman entanglements based not on conceptual 
models, but on affective and embodied resonance.  
Conclusion 
In this article we discussed a systematic analysis of metaphorical patterns in three contemporary 
novels belonging to what Trexler calls ‘Anthropocene fiction’: Atwood’s Oryx and Crake, Winterson’s 
The Stone Gods, and McEwan’s Solar. Our core argument was that metaphor is a powerful tool in 
revealing the complex interrelation between the human and the nonhuman by bridging large-scale 
processes which are difficult to conceptualize (e.g., the dynamics of ecosystems, climatological and 
geological processes) with human embodied experience. Moreover, following Martens and Biebuyck 
(2013), we claimed that literary narratives tend to deploy clusters of semantically related metaphors 
coalescing in ‘paranarratives’ which often conceptually and affectively complicate and expand the 
meanings emerging from plots and narrative structures.  
In order to identify these metaphorical patterns in our data we employed a combination of 
qualitative coding and computer-aided descriptive statistics. We created six categories, three of 
them dealing with nonhuman realities (objects and structures (O), living nonhuman creatures and 
biological processes (LN), and natural elements and processes (W)) and the other three with human 
embodiment and experience (the human body and biological processes occurring in the body (LH), 
abstract concepts (A), and psychological states (P)). We coded all metaphors involving a nonhuman 
element as target or source and used our quantitative results to trace the paranarratives operating 
in the novels; further, we analysed how these paranarratives interact with narrative and thematic 
strategies. 
In the case of Atwood’s novel, our results indicated that although the human gravitates to a central 
position (by being the target of 70.38% of the metaphors), it is nevertheless ironically devalued and 
undermined by being continuously compared to objects (including, most poignantly, food). Thus, 
even though at the level of the novel’s plot the human maintains its centrality, the underlying 
paranarrative stages an anti-anthropocentric worldview, questioning clear-cut distinctions between 
the human species and nonhuman realities. 
Winterson’s novel, on the other hand, appears to seek a balance between the human as source and 
the human as target in its metaphors, and stages a circular metaphysics in which human subjectivity 
is conceptualized as both infiltrating nonhuman realities such as geology or the cosmos (an aspect 
revealed by metaphorical clusters where the nonhuman is anthropomorphized) and being inherently 
shaped by them (in metaphors where astronomical and geological references are used to enchant 
and transfigure the human body). Thus, the metaphorical paranarrative evokes a sense of circularity 
between the human and the nonhuman, feeding into—and reinforcing—the circularity pervading 
the novel at the level of plot and themes.   
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Finally, in McEwan’s Solar, the protagonist’s grotesque embodiment is satirically used as a channel 
of communication with the nonhuman realities of climate change. By employing metaphorical 
paranarratives conceptualizing his body in terms of climatological and geological processes dealing 
with the increasing (anthropogenic) decay characterizing our planet, McEwan builds a powerful 
satire against the limitations of scientific institutions (and perhaps of humanity at large) in dealing 
with the ecological crisis.  
As it became clear from these readings, the methodology we employed can systematize the study of 
metaphorical patterns in narrative by allowing for more precise, statistically grounded comparisons 
between thematically related texts. Our quantitative analysis of the novels has served not to 
discount interpretive forms of engagement, but to extend the foothold of interpretation, through a 
productive back-and-forth between the identification of quantifiable patterns and the close reading 
of the broader context in which those patterns occur. As discussed in the introduction, one of the 
tenets of conceptual metaphor theory is that metaphorical language tends to collapse the abstract 
and intangible into human-scale, embodied interactions with the environment (see, e.g., Turner, 
1996). In broad strokes, this is confirmed in our corpus by the high frequency of mappings such as O 
→ A or O → P (9.36% and 7.97% respectively across the novels), which use human-scale objects as 
the source domain, more abstract concepts as the target domain. Yet our results show that this 
tendency can be partly reversed in literary fiction through mappings that leave the human on the 
side lines (LN → W; 3.89%), use the nonhuman as a source domain (W → LH; 4.91%), or project the 
human onto the nonhuman world (LH → W; 3.43%). These mappings may be less frequent in purely 
statistical terms, but they become salient in interpretation, because they are less predictable than O 
→ A or O → P associations. These metaphorical expressions involving the nonhuman challenge the 
anthropocentric set-up of everyday language (as reflected in the animacy scale, for instance) and 
make a key contribution to the broader critique of anthropocentrism articulated by Anthropocene 
fiction. Further, the multiplicity and mixed directionality of the metaphors we identified in the three 
novels explain how literary fiction can challenge established patterns of metaphor usage, going 
beyond the entrenched language of much political discourse and therefore, potentially, 
complexifying the reader’s imagination of human-nonhuman connection. 
Our discussion offers a template for ecocritical approaches to narrative that, like James’s (2015) 
econarratology, aim to go beyond a merely diegetic or thematic level of analysis. We posit that 
literary metaphor is a formal, stylistic site of negotiation of human-nonhuman entanglements in 
narrative. Not only can such creative metaphors be quantified and compared systematically across 
novels (and, potentially, genres and text types), but they afford an opportunity for rethinking our 
imagination of the nonhuman outside of literary fiction as well. A fuller awareness of the potential of 
creative metaphor could benefit media discourse and science communication (see, e.g., Dahlstrom, 
2014), both of which need more sophisticated and emotionally impactful narratives to convey our 
precarious position vis-à-vis the nonhuman world.  
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